This paper highlights the rare conditions that lead to international cooperation, and the reasons why eliciting this cooperation may be beneficial in preventing adverse tail shocks from spiraling into global depressions. In normal economic times, deeper macro cooperation among countries is associated with welfare gains akin to Harberger's second-order magnitude triangle, thus making the odds of cooperation low. When bad tail events induce imminent threats of financial collapse, the perceived losses have a first-order magnitude of terminating the total Marshalian surpluses. The apprehension of these losses in perilous times may elicit rare and beneficial macro cooperation. We close the paper by overviewing the obstacles preventing cooperation and the proliferation of precautionary policies of emerging market economies as a second-best outcome of limited cooperation.
Introduction
The global financial crisis (GFC) has renewed the debate on the benefits and limitations of the international coordination of macro policies. This paper takes stock of the GFC lessons regarding the usefulness and limitations of international macro cooperation in perilous times. The history of international cooperation during the GFC resembles a glass that is half full to some and half empty to others. Remarkably, the US Federal Reserve Bank (FED) fostered international cooperation by an unprecedented expansion of swap lines beginning in December of 2007. 1 Yet, on 30 January 2014, Raghuram Rajan, Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, noted that 'international monetary cooperation has broken down . . . The U.S. should worry about the effects of its policies on the rest of the world'.
The complex history of limited global cooperation was evaluated by Eichengreen (2013) , who concluded that successful cooperation is most likely to occur in the following scenarios: when it centers on technical issues, when it is institutionalized, when it is concerned with preserving an existing set of policies and behaviors, and when it occurs in the context of broad reciprocity among nations. Frankel (2015) provided a synopsis of the history of international economic cooperation from the Great Depression, analyzing episodes in which countries behaved cooperatively or non-cooperatively in international fiscal and monetary games. He concluded that perceptions of spillover signs and directions of coordination vary widely and inhibit cooperation. Furthermore, Frankel surmised that the existence of different models and domestic interest groups is important in explaining the limited scope of international cooperation. Complaints about foreigners' actions and calls for cooperation may obscure the need to settle disagreements domestically.
A central policy lesson of these insightful papers is that international cooperation is rare and occurs mostly in exceptional circumstances. Hence, countries may invest more in precautionary strategies and putting their houses in order in anticipation of trouble. In this paper I highlight the rare conditions leading to international cooperation and the reasons why eliciting such cooperation may be needed to prevent adverse tail shocks from spiraling into global depressions. Section 3 presents an overview of the obstacles preventing cooperation, including status quo biases and costly stakeholders' war of attrition aiming at minimize their shares of adjustment costs. Section 4 focuses on policy implications, linking the discussion to precautionary policies of emerging markets economies (EMs) as the second-best outcome of limited cooperation.
Circumstances that lead to greater international cooperation
The rarity of international cooperation suggests that in 'normal times,' in the absence of bad tail events, the costs of deeper international cooperation fall short of the benefits. This concept is in line with the presumption that the gains from cooperation assume the size of Harberger's triangle -approximately 0.5-1% GDP points. 2 Such gains may not be worth the possible income redistribution effects that may be of even larger magnitude than efficiency gains from cooperation ( Figure 1) .
In contrast, large adverse tail shocks that may induce the imminent collapse of financial markets could bring massive losses. Collapsing financial markets might terminate the entire Marshalian surplus associated with normal operations, triggering global financial contagion in domestic and global networks, and generating costs of double-digit GDP points. Thereby, in normal times, the cooperative solution is associated with welfare gains akin to Harberger's second-order magnitude triangle, and as such, the odds of cooperation are low. In circumstances in which bad tail events may induce an imminent collapse of the international financial system, the perceived losses have a first-order magnitude of from The Boards of Governors Policy Overview, Dollar Liquidity Swap Lines http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/ bst_liquidityswaps.htm (Retrieved November 25, 2015) . 2 See Harberger (1954 Harberger ( , 1959 for discussions on the second-order costs of distortions. See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) for a model that shows the benefits from monetary policy coordination that might arise in a two-country world are small and may be swamped by the gains from pursuing stabilization policies within the individual countries. terminating the total Marshalian surplus. This imminent threat may promote international cooperation.
The first year of the GFC illustrated that exceptional circumstances may lead to beneficial cooperation. The FED swap lines that were activated during the quarters leading to the GFC are a prime example of bad tail events that induced global cooperation. The pre-crisis dynamics led to a huge dollar-funding gap with the potential of a collapse of a large share of the global banking system and thereby wiping the surpluses associated with the liquidity and credit services of financial intermediation. The magnitude of the dollar-funding gap in 2007 and 2008 was unprecedented. According to McGuire and von Peter (2009), If we assume that these banks' liabilities to money market funds (roughly $1 trillion, Baba et al (2009)) are also short-term liabilities, then the estimate of their US dollar funding gap in mid-2007 would be $2.0-2.2 trillion. Were all liabilities to non-banks treated as short-term funding, the upper-bound estimate would be $6.5 trillion . . .
On 13 October 2008, the swap lines between the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, the ECB and the Swiss National Bank became unlimited to accommodate any quantity of US dollar funding demanded. The swap lines provided these central banks with ammunition beyond their existing foreign exchange reserves (Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2009) ), which in mid-2007 amounted to $294 billion for the euro area, Switzerland and the UK combined, an order of magnitude smaller than our lower-bound estimate of the US dollar-funding gap.
In providing US dollars on a global scale, the Federal Reserve effectively engaged in international lending of last resort. The swap network can be understood as a mechanism by which the Federal Reserve extends loans, collateralized by foreign currencies, to other central banks, which in turn make these funds available through US dollar auctions in their respective jurisdictions. This made US dollar liquidity accessible to commercial banks around the world, including those that have no US subsidiaries or insufficient eligible collateral to borrow directly from the Federal Reserve System.
The quantities of US dollars actually allotted through US dollar auctions in Europe provide an indication of European banks' US dollar funding shortfall at any point in time. Most of the Federal Reserve's international provision of US dollars was indeed channeled through central banks in Europe, consistent with the finding that the funding pressures were particularly acute among European banks. Once the swap lines became unlimited, the share provided through the Eurosystem, the Bank of England and the Swiss National Bank combined was 81% (15 October 2008), and it has remained in the range of 50-60% since December 2008.
The benefits of swap lines may be modeled using a version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) paper in which the lender of last resort may prevent the first-order costs of a financial panic on the order of magnitude of those observed during the Great Depression. 3 The cost-benefit analysis of international cooperation is illustrated in Figure 2 , in which a deeper international cooperation effort is measured to the right along the X-axis and the marginal cost of eliciting deeper cooperation is measured vertically along the solid Marginal Cost (MC) curve. The marginal benefit of higher cooperation effort in the aftermath of a bad tail event is traced by the dotted MB [Financial Crisis] curve, resulting in cooperation level CO and inducing first-order benefits traced in the large shaded triangle below the MB [Financial Crisis] curve and above the MC line. In contrast, in normal economic times, the marginal benefits associated with eliciting more cooperation, which is traced by the broken MB [No Crisis] curve and located below the MC curve, are too small to elicit cooperation. 4 This example suggests that a key benefit of ex ante international cooperation may be reducing the probability of bad tail events as well as balance-sheet exposure to such events. 5 This mission may be a top priority for international financial institutions (IFIs) and central banks (CBs). The benefits of such ex ante cooperation include setting swap lines, establishing contingent credit lines, and instituting leverage rules that reduce the amplitude of credit cycles. Achieving this cooperation cannot be taken for grantedex ante cooperation has to deal with complex moral hazard as well as agency problems. Furthermore, the benefits of such cooperation are easily overlooked as the counterfactual; that is, all of the tail events that were prevented by cooperation are hard to measure.
Obstacles preventing cooperation
The obstacles preventing cooperation may be hard to overcome. Status quo bias may reduce macroeconomic cooperation, both domestically and internationally (see Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988) . This is the case if policymakers and agencies take the view that 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it'. In terms of Figure 2 , this perspective would correspond to adding a significant fixed cost to the decision of eliciting cooperation. Such a fixed cost may reflect the concern that changing the status quo might trigger political costs, inducing the decision maker to delay action and thus gamble on resurrection. New policies may raise income distribution concerns, triggering a war of attrition among key stakeholders aimed at shifting the adjustment costs to others and thus delay cooperation. 6 One expects that greater income inequality and polarization may intensify the incidence of attrition wars that delay adjustment. This notion is in line with Rodrik (1999) , who found that countries that experienced the sharpest drops in growth after 1975 were divided societies (as measured by indicators of inequality, ethnic fragmentation, and the like) with weak institutions of conflict management (measured by indicators of the quality of governmental institutions, rule of law, democratic rights, and social safety nets).
To illustrate, the interpretation by Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) of the gains from competitive devaluation during the Great Depression is an example of a non-cooperative outcome that, over time, led to an aftereffect akin to a coordinated global monetary expansion. The delay in achieving this cooperative outcome may reflect the resistance of domestic powerful groups (e.g. 'rentiers') engaging in a war of attrition against interest rate cuts and monetary expansions. Similarly, it may be easier to achieve sizable fiscal and current account adjustments -frequently needed to stabilize developing countries -in places with lesser polarization. An example of this is South Korea, which improved its current account by about 13% GDP points in the two years following the East Asian crisis. Although this adjustment was feasible in South Korea, it was not feasible in euro-periphery countries in recent years or in most developing countries. Status quo bias may also explain Central Banks [CBs] unwillingness to increase inflation targeting from 2% to 4% in times of global peril, as was advocated by Blanchard, Dell'Ariccia, and Mauro (2010) .
Principle-agent, moral hazards, and political constraints matter as they restrict the feasibility of ex ante cooperative arrangements and ex post stabilization efforts. The provision of swap lines by the US FED during the GFC is a prime example of international cooperation inducing first-order effects. However, the FED only extended the swap lines to four EMs, which reflected the imminent costs to US financial institutions of possible defaults by Mexican and Korean counterparties. Exposure of US banks to EMs turned out to be the most important selection criterion for the swap lines provided by the FED to the selected four EMs (see Aizenman & Pasricha, 2010) . This selectivity probably reflected the FED's concern that its future independence would be constrained by overextending swap lines to EMs with history of sovereign defaults. China does not face such constraints and is supplying swap lines to large groups of developing countries, including Argentina and other countries with a history of defaults.
Precautionary policies
Developing countries and EMs are more vulnerable to adverse tail events. Their limited financial depth, the inability to borrow in their own currency, less-developed institutions, and a possible history of defaults all imply greater vulnerability. The scarcity of global cooperation at times of peril suggests that EMs would benefit from building precautionary buffers during tranquil times, such as international reserves (IR) and sovereign wealth funds(SWF). The precautionary logic of hoarding IR can be outlined in models inspired by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Calvo (1998) , in which IRs may reduce the costs associated with sudden stops and capital flight crises (see Aizenman & Lee, 2007) . However, relying mainly on IR may miss the benefits associated with policies aimed at controlling a country's balance sheet exposures -for example, reducing its short-term external borrowing (Rodrik, 2006) .
The limitations of reserves in preventing a financial panic were vividly illustrated during the GFC by South Korea. Less than a decade after the East Asian Crisis, Korea's IRs/GDP in 2005 seemed to be more than adequate using conventional yardsticks, namely IR that exceeded short-term debt and allowed financing several quarters of imports. Following the sizable increase in Korea's external debt after 2005, the sense of IR abundance in South Korea evaporated. The Korean external short-term debt/GDP ratio increased from 7.5% in 2004 to 20% in 2008 while the overall external debt/GDP increased during the same period from 23% to 50% without a significant change in the IR/GDP ratio. The onset of the global liquidity crisis in 2008 and the ensuing deleveraging vividly illustrated South Korea's fragile balance sheet. During the first stage of the crisis, South Korea's reserves dropped by $60 billion in half a year, a decline of about 25%. IRs were key to the bailout package that the Korean government unveiled in the second half of 2008. The centerpiece of the package was a $100 billion three-year government guarantee for Korean banks' foreign debt. This sum was more than sufficient to cover the banks' foreign debt maturation by June 2009, which was estimated by the Korean Ministry of Strategy and Finance to be approximately $80 billion.
However, Park (2009) noted that despite the large hoarding of IR used to finance the bailout package, market concerns were not abated: Similar guarantees had failed to allay fears of financial meltdown at the beginning of the Asian crisis in 1997 and they failed again. As in 1997, the market reactions were indifferent. Only when Korea secured a swap line amounting to $30 billion from the FED on October 30 the foreign exchange market settled down somewhat, but not very long . . . Only when it was made clear that the FED would renew the swap agreement, foreign investors' confidence in the Korean economy improved and stability in the foreign exchange market returned toward the end of the first quarter of 2009. A possible lesson articulated by Professor Hyun-Song Shin (serving as the chief economic advisor to President Lee Myung-bak from 2009 to 2010) are policies inducing the private sector to internalize the social costs of external hard currency borrowing, possibly by relying on Pigovian taxes. 7 These considerations are reflected in the proliferation of macro-prudential policies after the GFC, 8 and exemplified by the policies adopted by South Korea in 2010. Bruno and Shin (2014) credited these policies with the decrease of the sensitivity of capital flows into South Korea to global conditions in the period following the introduction of macro-prudential policies. The deeper proliferation of SWFs, serving as a second line of defense by augmenting IR with other foreign assets, implies that EMs may also strive towards deeper cooperation between their CBs, SWFs, and national treasuries. The pioneering papers of Frankel (2011), and Frankel, Vegh, and Vuletin (2013) , show that this can be done, with Chile as a prime example.
Greater exchange rate flexibility is another margin of safety, mitigating the moral hazard game between the private sector (ignoring exchange rate risk) and the CB (which is expected to bail out systemic balance-sheet exposure). Indeed, EMs took these lessons to heart after the financial crises of the 1990s. These precautionary policies were tested by the GFC with mixed outcomes, leading Rey (2013) to doubt the usefulness of exchange rate flexibility. Specially, Rey concluded that a potent global financial cycle exists in gross capital flows, credit creation, and asset prices, all of which have tight connections with fluctuations in uncertainty and risk aversion. The global financial cycle is closely related to the VIX (CBOE Volatility Index), and particularly related to the role of monetary policy in the center country. Accordingly, this potent cycle invalidates Mundell's trilemma and leads to a new 'irreconcilable duo' dilemma, in which independent monetary policies are possible if and only if the capital account is managed, directly or indirectly, via macro-prudential policies.
Chances are, however, that claims of the trilemma's death and the futility of flexible exchange rate regimes are greatly exaggerated. An alternative take is that Mundell's trilemma morphed into a quadrilemma, wherein financial stability is a fourth dimension of a desirable macro outcome. For most financial variables, the strength of the links with the center economies have been the dominant factor over the last two decades, while the movements of the policy interest rate have also appeared sensitive to global financial shocks around the EM crises of the late 1990s and since the 2008 GFC. While certain macroeconomic and institutional variables are important, the arrangement of open macro policies such as the exchange rate regime and financial openness have also been found to have a direct influence on sensitivity to the center economies (Aizenman, Chinn, & Ito, forthcoming) .
An economy that pursues greater exchange rate stability and financial openness faces a stronger link with the center economies through policy interest rates and real effective exchange rate (REER) movements. Exchange market pressure (EMP) in peripheral economies is sensitive to the movements of the center economies' REER and EMP during and after the GFC. Open macro-policy arrangements, especially exchange rate regimes, also have indirect effects on the strength of financial linkages by interaction with other macroeconomic conditions. Thus, trilemma policy arrangements, including exchange rate flexibility, continue to affect the sensitivity of developing countries to policy changes and shocks in the center economies. In this context, the quality of institutions matters; that is, countries that constrain their balance-sheet exposure keep benefiting from exchange rate flexibility. Countries with better institutions may use macro-prudential policies and capital controls more effectively with exchange rate flexibility (Aizenman and Binici, 2016) .
Similarly, Ghosh, Ostry, and Qureshi (2015) found that macroeconomic and financial vulnerabilities are significantly greater under less flexible exchange rate regimes -including hard pegs -as compared with floats. Although not especially susceptible to banking or currency crises, hard pegs are significantly more prone to growth collapses, suggesting that the security of the hard end of exchange rate regimes is largely illusory. Blanchard, Ostry, Ghosh, and Chamon (2015) outline a mechanism in which greater against-the-wind intervention by the central bank to prevent currency overvaluation reduces a crisis likelihood, while greater intervention to defend an overvalued currency raises a crisis likelihood. In this context, disaggregation matters. For a given policy interest rate, bond inflows lead to currency appreciation and are contractionary, while non-bond inflows lead to an appreciation as well as a decrease in the cost of borrowing, and thus may be expansionary. These observations led the authors to conclude that monetary policy and foreign exchange intervention can, in principle, offset the effect of inflows on both exchange rates and the rate of return to non-bonds without a need for capital controls. Blanchard, Adler, and de Carvalho Filho (2015) show empirical results that are broadly supportive of the abovementioned interpretation. While bond inflows have a negative effect on economic activity, non-bond inflows have a significant and positive effect. Non-bond inflows (excluding foreign direct investment (FDI)) have a strong positive effect on credit -much stronger than bond flows. FDI inflows, while increasing output, have a negative impact on credit, perhaps because some of the intermediation that would have taken place through banks has been replaced by FDI financing.
Latin American countries (LATAMs) may provide useful lessons. The GFC increased LATAMs' exposure to larger and more volatile financial flows and to adverse shocks that followed the GFC. Starting in 2014, these shocks have included LATAMs' collapsing terms of trade due to the drop in commodity prices. However, most of the LATAMs have so far retained their resilience, wherein managed exchange-rate flexibility and greater coordination between domestic institutions has also helped. Chances are that the flexibility of the exchange rate of Mexico and other LATAMs has so far prevented a balance of payment cum banking crises, akin to the crisis observed during the 1990s (the 1994 -1995 Tequila crisis in Mexico and the Russia and Brazilian crises of 1998 -1999 . Exchange rate flexibility has also contributed to increasing financial stability in countries that have managed their balance-sheet exposures efficiently.
Exchange rate flexibility has other side benefits such as reducing the exposure of countries to destabilizing dynamics of the type experienced by Spain and other exposed eurozone countries in 2010-2012. Specifically, the fixed exchange rate associated with being a euro member restrains Spain's ability to quickly improve its competitiveness by means of a nominal exchange-rate adjustment, thus exposing the country to destabilizing rises in its sovereign spreads, as was analyzed by De Grauwe and Ji (2013) in their contrast between Spain and the UK. They pointed out that bond markets in a monetary union are more fragile and susceptible to self-fulfilling liquidity crises, as countries in a monetary union like the eurozone are unable to rely on monetary policy to stabilize the economy and to provide an effective lender of last resort support for the domestic banking system.
A similar illustration of the gains from exchange rate flexibility is the contrast between Poland [flexible exchange rate country, EU member] and Germany and Spain [eurozone countries]. Chart 3 shows the remarkable resilience of Poland, which managed an overall steady and positive real GDP growth rate under a flexible exchange rate during the 2000s and thus experienced a much milder exposure to the GFC and the eurozone crisis than Germany and Spain. 9 In the same vain, LATAMs, Russia, and other commodity countries , 1970-2014. 12 buffered the adverse commodity shocks of 2014-2015 via exchange-rate depreciations and spending some of their IR. These actions facilitated an easier adjustment in countries with limited balance-sheet exposure, but posed a challenge to countries with greater exposure (Figure 3) .
The potency of exchange rate flexibility at times of peril was also illustrated in the eurozone and Japan in 2011-2015. Once policy interest rates reached the zero bound, QE policies had a limited impact on encouraging bank investment lending but a powerful effect of the crisis. These considerations were reflected in the attitude of Beata Szydlo, the new Polish Premier elected in 2015, who described the euro as a 'bad idea' that would make Poland a 'second Greece'. ('ECB alarmed at UK push to rebrand Union' Financial Times, 12/5/2015). 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, and 2011-2014. on depreciating the euro and the yen. The weakness of the credit and balance sheet channels of monetary policy left the exchange rate adjustment to be among the few remaining powerful transmission mechanisms of monetary policy when the policy interest rate hit the zero bound. Exchange rate depreciation played an important role in nudging the inflation rate upwards from the deflationary trap, as well as in stimulating the economy via the improved competitiveness of the eurozone and Japan. The dwindling willingness to use fiscal policy in most OECD countries has increased the importance of the exchange rate flexibility as a viable policy channel of adjustment as illustrated by the growing strength of the dollar against the euro, yen, and other currencies in 2015. Exchange rate adjustments have helped to accommodate the growing asymmetry between the stronger US recovery and the anemic growth trends in the eurozone, Japan, China, and most EMs.
A flexible exchange rate, however, is not a panacea: Among n flexible exchange rate currencies, only n -1 are independent at most. Size matters even under flexible exchange rate regimes. The weakening gains from exchange rate flexibility highlighted by Rey (2013) may be the outcome of events that led to the GFC, in which US financial instability was transmitted globally due to global balance-sheet exposure, as the USA share in finance vastly exceeded its global GDP share. 10 These factors, however, do not negate the usefulness of managed exchange-rate flexibility in dealing with terms of trade shocks, domestic disturbances, and other shocks. Indeed, the lesson of the 1990s has been that EMs converged to the middle ground of Mundell's trilemma; that is, in controlled exchange-rage flexibility, limited financial integration, and retaining monetary independence, as shown in Figures 4 and 5. 11
Conclusion
The scarcity of global cooperation validates the need for countries to put their houses in order. This recommendation does not negate the key importance of global cooperation in the aftermath of bad tail events -that is, shocks that may induce a global depression. A key role of IFIs and CBs remains facilitating deeper ex ante international cooperation aimed at reducing the probability of such tail events. Time will continue to test the viability of such cooperation.
The evolution of EMs in past decades may reflect the learning process induced by the sudden stop crises that have followed their financial openings of the 1990s. Over time, EMs have moved from fixed exchange rates and closed financial systems during the Bretton Woods system to controlled exchange-rate flexibility and limited financial integration, thus retaining monetary independence. This configuration, properly buffered by precautionary policies (such as hoarding IR and controlling external borrowing) may be EM economies' second-best response to the limited efficacy of international coordination.
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